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WAIVERS OF INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS VIA
TREATY: CHINESE SLAVE LABORERS,
JAPANESE JURISPRUDENCE, AND THE
SOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION

W

ith controversial and limited exceptions, international law provides sovereign governments with the ability to waive the
claims of their citizens that arise out of war or international conflict.1
Nations often dispense with individual claims for war reparations or
compensation by means of peace treaties with other nations, which establish the presumption of settling all outstanding issues relating to a war.2
The reasons for this are logical and imposing: governments require the
flexibility to establish peace and rebuild societies following eras of warfare and turmoil, and the relinquishment of all war claims is often essential to the attainment of such goals.3 If war-torn and dismantled postwar
1. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 468 (D. N.J. 1999) (“It is wellestablished that countries can waive the war-related claims of their citizens.”); ARNOLD
DUNCAN MCNAIR, LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR 391 (3d ed. 1948) (“[I]t appears that international law treats a state as being invested for international purposes with complete power
to affect by treaty the private rights of its nationals, whether by disposing of their property, surrendering their claims, changing their nationality, or otherwise.”).
2. Id. See also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 230 (1796) (“I apprehend that the treaty
of peace abolishes the subject of the war, and that after peace is concluded, neither the
matter in dispute, nor the conduct of either party, during the war, can ever be revived, or
brought into contest again. All violences, injuries, or damages sustained by the government, or people of either, during the war, are buried in oblivion; and all those things are
implied by the very treaty of peace; and therefore not necessary to be expressed.”).
3. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679 (1981) (“Not infrequently in
affairs between nations, outstanding claims by nationals of one country against the government of another country are ‘sources of friction’ between the two sovereigns. To resolve these difficulties, nations have often entered into agreements settling the claims of
their respective nationals. As one treatise writer puts it, international agreements settling
claims by nationals of one state against the government of another ‘are established international practice reflecting traditional international theory.’”). See also Andrea Gattini,
To What Extent are State Immunity and Non-Justiciability Major Hurdles to Individuals’
Claims for War Damages, 1 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 348, 365 (2003) (“[T]aking into account the main objective of [peace treaties] which is to re-establish a state of peace and, if
possible, friendly relations between states in the interest of their communities, it seems
inconceivable that any individual could disturb or even disrupt the whole process of
peacemaking for pecuniary satisfaction of a purported right, whose foundation in interna-
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nations expend their limited resources and are substantially occupied
with defending themselves from numerous lawsuits, it would be very
difficult for such nations to ever reestablish social, economic, and political security, much less attain a state wherein they could flourish.4 However, with the increasing emphasis on human rights in international law,5
scholars and jurists are beginning to rethink the premise behind allowing
governments to waive these individual claims, and serious concerns have
been expressed as to the premise’s legality and fairness, especially in
cases of grave human rights violations or breaches of jus cogens norms.6
In balancing the legitimate concerns of governments in waiving claims
against an individual’s right to bring suit for harms suffered, the question
remains as to whether a sovereign nation’s ability to waive such claims
may be infringed, particularly when the underlying harm to a plaintiff is
an egregious breach of a jus cogens norm.7

tional law is still dubious.”); Dinusha Panditaratne, Rights-Based Approaches to Examining Waiver Clauses in Peace Treaties: Lessons from the Japanese Forced Labor Litigation in Californian Courts, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 299, 327 (2005) (“[T]here
may be instances where a waiver of human rights claims may be indispensable in bringing about the conclusion of a war or other international crisis. In these circumstances, a
government may need to agree to a waiver clause, even though the resulting impunity
will undoubtedly be painful to bear for those persons who have suffered at the hands of
that state and its nationals . . . .”).
4. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
5. Regarding the rise of human rights in international law, Lord Millett explains:
The fundamental human rights of individuals, deriving from the inherent dignity of the human person, ha[ve] become a commonplace of international law.
Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations [i]s taken to impose an obligation on all states to promote universal respect for and observance of human
rights and fundamental freedoms. The trend [i]s clear. War crimes ha[ve] been
replaced by crimes against humanity. The way in which a state treat[s] its own
citizens within its own borders ha[s] become a matter of legitimate concern to
the international community.
Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Mag., Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte, 1 A.C. 147, 275
(1999).
6. See Gattini, supra note 3, at 349 (“[I]t is necessary to somehow restrict [a government’s ability to waive its citizens’ claims], in particular through the qualification that
the state’s renunciation is invalid, should it be made with regard to injury caused by a
grave violation of peremptory norms.”). See also Panditaratne, supra note 3, at 327
(“[J]udges should articulate the varied policy considerations at stake and, in particular,
remain mindful of upholding their responsibility to protect individual human rights to the
extent possible. Judges should protect rights in a manner reconcilable with the text of the
waiver clause, while adopting an approach consistent with judicial precedent.”).
7. See Michael Winn, Note, Peace Treaty Claim Waivers: The Case of Prince HansAdam II of Liechtenstein and the “Scene at a Roman Well,” 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
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In 2001, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) struggled
with the issue of whether to invalidate a peace treaty claim waiver in the
case Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany (“Liechtenstein”), in which the plaintiff, a monarch of Liechtenstein, attempted to
reclaim property confiscated by the Czech Republic (part of the former
Czechoslovakia) in the period following World War II (“WWII”).8 The
ECHR echoed several previous local German courts’ decisions that
barred the prince’s claim based on a 1952 treaty between three of the
Allied Powers and Germany9 in which Germany relinquished all claims
relating to property or assets appropriated by other nations following the
war.10 In determining whether the 1952 agreement had legitimately
waived the plaintiff’s claims, the ECHR utilized a test, which provides
that any limitation on a plaintiff’s claim—in this case, the treaty waiver—must not “restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a
way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right [to bring the
claim] is impaired.”11 Furthermore, the test requires that the limitation a
government imposes on a plaintiff’s claim must “pursue a legitimate aim
and . . . [have] a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.”12 Thus, restated
simply, the ECHR’s “legitimate aim” test consists of the following three
elements, which, if not met by the waiving nation, require a court to
deem its treaty waiver invalid: (1) the waiver must seek a legitimate aim;
(2) the waiver must be reasonably proportional to that legitimate aim;
and (3) the “very essence” of the claim must not be impaired by the
waiver.13
On the other side of the world, this issue is deeply felt, as many WWIIera Chinese slave labor victims have been bringing claims in Japanese
807, 826 (2006) (“Legal scholars contest the legal limits of a state’s right to waive claims
on the basis of treaty.”).
8. Prince Hans-Adam II of Liech. v. F.R.G., App. No. 42527/98, 2001-VIII Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1, 3 (2001).
9. Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the Occupation, May 26, 1952, 332 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Convention on the Settlement].
10. Liech., 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, at 19–20. For a critique and discussion of the
ECHR’s decision in Liechtenstein, see Winn, supra note 7.
11. Liech., 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, at 23.
12. Id.
13. See id. Andrea Gattini restates the elements of the ECHR’s “legitimate aim” test
as follows: “[R]estrictions on access to justice are [lawful], where (a) they pursue a legitimate aim; (b) they are proportionate to the aim pursued; and (c) they do not restrict the
right to the point of extinguishing it.” Andrea Gattini, A Trojan Horse for Sudeten
Claims? On Some Implications of the Prince of Liechtenstein v. Germany, 13 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 513, 530 (2002).
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courts against the Japanese government and certain Japanese corporations since the 1990s, all in the face of a waiver of claims by the Chinese
government.14 Defendants in these slave labor15 lawsuits have often succeeded in having the plaintiffs’ claims dismissed based on the Chinese
government’s renunciation of war reparations16 expressed in a 1972 Joint
Communiqué 17 and ratified in the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship
between Japan and the People’s Republic of China.18 Courts have frequently determined that, despite the treaty waiver’s ambiguity with regard to individual claims, it nevertheless precludes them.19 For more than
a decade, the Supreme Court of Japan failed to comment on the issue of

14. For a detailed discussion and history of the Chinese slave labor lawsuits in Japan,
see Timothy Webster, Note, Sisyphus in a Coal Mine: Responses to Slave Labor in Japan
and the United States, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (2006). Some Chinese slave laborers, as
well as American POWs and primarily Korean sex slaves of the Japanese military (socalled “jūgun-ianfu” or “military comfort women”), have also sought recourse in U.S.
courts. See id. at 755–58. For an in-depth discussion of WWII slave labor lawsuits in U.S.
courts, see John Haberstroh, Note, In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation and Obstacles to International Human Rights Claims in U.S. Courts, 10 ASIAN
L.J. 253 (2003).
15. Like Timothy Webster, see supra note 14, this Note chooses to use the terminology “slave labor” as opposed to the euphemistic phrase “forced labor” (“kyōsei rōdō”)
often utilized by Japanese courts when describing the activity suffered by the Chinese
plaintiffs during WWII. See, e.g., Chinese Victims of Forced Labor v. Mitsui Mining,
1809 HANREI JIHŌ 111 (Fukuoka Dist. Ct., Apr. 26, 2002). The opening caption to the
case reads: “[t]his case admits claims based in tort for damages by Chinese individuals
forcibly taken to Japan during the Pacific War [WWII] and made to perform forced labor
in coal mines (and other venues) against the coal mining firms [under which they worked
during the war].” Id. at 111 (emphasis added) (author’s translation).
16. See Shin Hae Bong, The Right of War Crime Victim to Compensation Before
National Court: Compensation for Victims of Wartime Atrocities: Recent Developments
in Japan’s Case Law, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 187, 190 (2005) (“In many cases, the government of Japan has successfully invoked [China’s waiver of war reparations] to insist
that the matter of war reparations had already been resolved between [China and Japan]
and that inter-governmental agreements preclude individuals’ claims for compensation.”).
17. Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the
People’s Republic of China (1972), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/china/joint72.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) [hereinafter Joint Communiqué].
18. Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China
(1978), available at http://www.cn.emb-japan.go.jp/bilateral_e/bunken_1978joyaku_e.htm (last
visited Oct. 31, 2008) [hereinafter Treaty of Peace and Friendship].
19. See William Gao, Note, Overdue Redress: Surveying and Explaining the Shifting
Japanese Jurisprudence on Victims’ Compensation Claims, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
529, 536 (2007) (“Japanese courts most commonly dismiss [war] compensation suits
based on bilateral agreements between Japan and the plaintiff’s nation of origin. The
rationale is that such bilateral agreements effectively resolve questions of compensation
between the two nations and preclude individual claims.”).
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war reparations for victims of Japanese slave labor and the treaty waiver
of 1972.20 However, in the landmark decision of Lü Zhigang v. Nishimatsu
Construction (“Nishimatsu”) in April 2007, the Court dismissed the
claims of Chinese slave laborers, reversing the decision of the Hiroshima
High Court in the plaintiffs’ favor, and concluding that Chinese WWII
victims are estopped from bringing claims owing to the waiver, despite
its ambiguity.21
Following this Introduction, Part I of this Note reviews the traditional
interpretation of treaty waivers in international law and an important potential exception to the rule that continues to gain influence as international law develops and human rights become a more paramount concern.
Part II discusses the Liechtenstein case and the ECHR’s legitimate aim
test. Part III provides background on the Japanese slave labor situation
and reviews several key Japanese decisions that have interpreted the
Chinese treaty waiver, culminating with an assessment of the Nishimatsu
Japanese Supreme Court case. Part IV uses the Japanese slave labor situation as a test case for the ECHR’s legitimate aim analysis, concluding
that the test tends to favor the Chinese plaintiffs and allows them to override their government’s treaty waiver. In conclusion, this Note argues
that when a treaty waiver is ambiguous and its scope undefined,22 the
legitimate aim test can serve as a viable method for courts to balance the

20. William Gao notes that currently there are increasing limitations on appellate
review within the Japanese legal system, which make it ever more difficult for lower
court decisions to obtain supreme court review. Id. at 545–46.
21. Lü Zhigang v. Nishimatsu Constr., 1969 HANREI JIHŌ 31 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 27,
2007), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20070427134258.pdf.
22. Cf. Gattini, supra note 3, at 366 (“[I]t is usual for states to be extremely careful to
specify the exact purport of their will, i.e. whether they intend to dispose only of their
claims; of all possible claims of their citizens under domestic law; to bar access to domestic courts without disposing of the substantive right; or to waive only the exercise of
diplomatic protection. The admissibility of civil actions before a domestic court must
then be judged in light of the specific compact.”). As Gattini suggests, clarity is essential
in the adjudication of claims relating to treaty waivers, and governments are indeed cognizant of the fact, using highly specific language to express their will. Since governments
require predictable rules to follow when establishing peace, this Note limits the application of the legitimate aim test only to situations where the treaty waiver is ambiguous.
Thus, if the threshold question of ambiguity in a waiver provision is not met, this Note
would argue that, for efficiency reasons, the test should not be applied at all. This requirement of provision clarity encourages governments to be explicitly clear as to what
exactly is being waived, and allows them a framework for drafting these waivers with the
confidence that the floodgates of litigation involving individual claims will not be unleashed following a war.
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traditional governmental ability to waive claims against an individual’s
right to bring claims.23
I. TREATY WAIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. General Principles of Treaty Interpretation
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”) is generally acknowledged as the “codification of the customary
international law governing treaties” and serves as binding international
law even for nations that are nonsignatories.24 It provides that treaties are
to be “interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms . . . in their context and in the light of [their] object and purpose.”25 The U.S. Supreme Court reiterated this principle by
affirming that, when interpreting the terms of a treaty, “clear import . . .
controls” unless applying the plain meaning of the language would be
incongruous with the “intent or expectations” of the parties.26 It follows
that generally, like all contracts, unless the context and intent of the parties clearly dictate otherwise, the “ordinary meaning” and “clear import”
of treaty provisions are to be strictly observed.27 In instances where a
plain reading of the language fails to yield conclusive answers, deference
should be given to the interpretations of the sovereign governments that
are parties to the treaty,28 especially when both parties agree to the same
interpretation.29

23. The question of whether victims of war crimes have the initial right to bring
claims under international law, either under a treaty provision such as Article 3 of the
Hague Convention, or under customary international law, is outside of the scope of this
Note. The issues entertained herein assume that the plaintiffs discussed already have such
a right; the essential question is whether a treaty waiver barring such a right may be overcome.
24. MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED
CONFLICT 5 (2005).
25. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
26. Sumitomo Shoji v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982).
27. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 457 (D.N.J. 1999) (citing numerous sources).
28. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 184–85.
29. Id. at 185. Interestingly, in order to determine parties’ intent, the United States
has shown more of an inclination than other countries to look outside of the plain language of treaty provisions and interpret them within the larger context of their drafting.
See BYERS, supra note 24, at 46. In fact, the U.S. delegation to the Vienna Convention
urged the other countries at the convention to codify this method of interpretation, but the
overwhelming majority of the participants rejected it, and instead, agreed upon the “ordi-
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B. Claim Waivers via Treaty
Under traditional principles of international law, sovereign nations
have the power to relinquish the claims of their citizens through effecting
peace treaties.30 The policy justifications for this are obvious: governments require the ability to efficiently orchestrate and reestablish beneficial
economic and collegial relationships with other nations through mutual
negotiation and compromise, particularly following an era of warfare, in
order to establish overall peace, cooperation, and international concord.31
Accordingly, the goals of a sovereign nation are often furthered by relinquishing certain rights, including the individual rights of its citizens, in
exchange for benefits that help establish the welfare of its people and
security in the international community.32 A prime example of the traditional international rule is expressed in Ware v. Hylton, the first U.S. Supreme Court case pertaining to the issue.33 In Ware, which involved a
British subject’s claims against an American citizen for damages that
arose out of the War of Independence, Justice Chase held: “All . . . injuries or damages sustained by the government, or people of either, during
the war, are buried in oblivion; and all those things are implied by the
very treaty of peace, and therefore not necessary to be expressed.”34
Ware therefore illustrates that, traditionally, international law considers
individual claims resulting from war-time activity to be automatically
dissolved by a government’s signing of a peace treaty, there ultimately
being no need for a sovereign nation to waive such claims expressly.35

nary meaning” interpretation, which was ultimately adopted by the Vienna Convention.
Id.; Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 31(1).
30. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
32. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679 (1981) (discussing the benefits
for governments in waiving the individual claims of their citizens as a means of resolving
postwar discord between nations).
33. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796).
34. Id. at 230 (emphasis added).
35. Andrea Gattini argues that the primary concern of courts when dealing with
claims waived through international settlement is that they are perceived as inherently
nonjusticiable, even if the judges deciding the cases do not expressly enunciate this view.
She states, “Even if the [nonjusticiability] argument is not always clearly articulated,
domestic courts are aware that the complex issues of post war settlements exceed the
scope of their jurisdiction and should therefore be left to governments, which are in a
better position to reach overall satisfactory and internationally binding settlements.”
Gattini, supra note 3, at 384.
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Undoubtedly, international law has developed since Ware,36 but its essential principle—that through enacting treaties, governments have control over the war-related claims of their citizens—is still the prevailing
view.37 In fact, Ware was recently cited in Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, a
2006 decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia involving claims against Japan by WWII-era “military comfort women”
from various East Asian countries (including China).38 In Hwang, the
court explained: “[c]ontrary to [the Ware rule], the [“military comfort
women”] insist the treaties between Japan and [their nations] preserved
the claims of individuals by failing to mention them.”39 The D.C. Circuit
was unsympathetic to their argument, however, refusing to interpret the
respective treaty provisions, and dismissing their claims as involving
nonjusticiable political questions.40
In contrast with the traditional rule allowing governments complete jurisdiction over their citizens’ claims, a noted scholar of international law
has remarked: “[t]he right of states to dispose of claims is increasingly
being challenged.”41 This results in part from an increasing worldwide
36. See Rudolf Dolzer, The Settlement of War-Related Claims: Does International
Law Recognize a Victim’s Private Right of Action? Lessons After 1945, 20 BERK. J. INT’L
L. 296, 297 (2002) (arguing that “the classical approach, which considers war-related
individual claims as being subsumed by the intergovernmental arrangements for peace,”
has undergone “revolutionary” changes in recent years).
37. See, e.g., Burger-Fischer v. Degussa, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 273–74 (D.N.J. 1999).
Burger-Fischer uses Ware as the basis for part of its decision to dismiss the treaty-waived
claims of Nazi slave labor victims and holds that, “under international law[,] claims for
compensation by individuals harmed by war-related activity belong exclusively to the
state of which the individual is a citizen.” Id. at 273. Therefore, under Burger-Fischer, a
nation’s power over its citizens’ war compensation claims is taken a step further, from
control to ownership, i.e., “belong[ing] exclusively to the state.” Id.
38. Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
39. Id. at 51.
40. Id. at 51–53.
41. Gattini, supra note 3, at 350. See also Dolzer, supra note 36, at 297. Dolzer discusses a progressive trend away from the traditional rule and toward an emphasis on the
individual’s right to adjudicate claims:
A decade ago, it would have been generally understood that only the classical
approach, which considers war-related individual claims as being subsumed by
the intergovernmental arrangements for peace, was consistent with international law as reflected in practice and doctrine. However, the 1990s have witnessed
a remarkable, and in some respects revolutionary, attempt to restructure the
classical approach to peacemaking and the resolution of matters relating to the
international consequences of war. In what may be described as an attempt to
replace the traditional exclusive government-to-government process of negotiating a comprehensive peace treaty, efforts were undertaken to adjudicate
claims by individuals before regular courts of law.
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sensitivity regarding human rights issues, as codified in international
agreements,42 and the perception that individuals possess complete ownership of their own right to bring compensation claims for wrongs they
have suffered.43 Although there is little evidence to indicate that courts
are following this ideological shift, and no clear indication of the restrictions, if any, imposed upon a government’s ability to waive individual
claims via treaty,44 one compelling theory of limitation on the traditional
rule is the jus cogens exception.45
C. The Jus Cogens Exception
Perhaps the most persuasive potential limitation on governmental
waivers of claims is the proposition that individual claims for breaches of
jus cogens norms cannot be waived.46 Jus cogens norms, also commonly
referred to as “peremptory norms,” are a body of the most supreme human rights protections considered common to and binding upon all naId.
42. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Mag., Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte, 1 A.C.
147, 275 (1999).
43. Jon M. Van Dyke, The Fundamental Human Right to Prosecution and Compensation, 29 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 77, 86 (2001) (“[C]laims based on violations of law
are a form of property that cannot be cavalierly waived by a nation . . . .”).
44. Winn, supra note 7, at 826, 829.
45. See id. at 829. Winn mentions an “alternative forum principle” as another possible
limitation on a government’s ability to waive claims:
[An] alternative forum principle . . . requires a state to offer an alternative forum such as a special tribunal [in exchange for waiving claims]. . . . An alternative forum serves a middle ground. . . . While the individual retains at least
some right to bring a claim, the waiving state serves its interests in judicial efficiency and minimization of potentially aggravating claims by raising the burden of proof or by offering less stringent procedural protections to the claimant.
Id. at 827–28. In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), the U.S. Supreme
Court seemed to apply a version of this principle when it held that the executive branch
of the U.S. government had legally waived the claims of its citizens taken hostage in Iran
by creating a separate arbitration “claims tribunal” where the aggrieved could bring their
claims. Id. at 686–87 (“Our conclusion [that the president legitimately waived the plaintiffs’ claims against Iran] is buttressed by the fact that the means chosen by the President
to settle the claims of American nationals provided an alternative forum, the Claims Tribunal, which is capable of providing meaningful relief.”). However, Winn contends that
this rule is probably limited to claims of foreign individuals waived by executive order,
and that war compensation claims waived by treaty are not within its scope. See Winn,
supra note 7, at 828.
46. See Van Dyke, supra note 43, at 86 (“Treaties and amnesty agreements purporting to waive claims [for violations of basic norms of human decency] or exonerate human
rights abusers . . . have no . . . validity . . . .”).
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tions.47 Generally accepted jus cogens norms include prohibitions against
military aggression, genocide, racial discrimination, torture, and slavery.48 Even before the nomenclature came into popular usage, the concept underlying jus cogens norms carried weight among judges, who began to characterize certain rights as “fundamental,” “inherent,” or “inalienable.”49 The Vienna Convention codifies the concept and defines a
jus cogens norm as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”50 The Vienna Convention
further states that any treaty conflicting with a jus cogens norm is per se
invalid.51 Therefore, though creatures of customary international law, jus
cogens norms are such significant human rights safeguards that they
override any conflicting treaty provision, even trumping the “clear import”
interpretation rule of treaties.52 As an example, two bordering nations
cannot contract through treaty to jointly massacre an unwelcome ethnic
minority population common to both nations; the jus cogens norm
against genocide would render their treaty null and void under international law.53
Despite the significance and weight of jus cogens norms in international law, it remains unclear whether claim waivers for their violation can or
should be invalidated.54 Notwithstanding this lack of clarity, there is considerable support for the proposition that courts should not allow governments to waive jus cogens claims, the most influential of which is the

47. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 488–90 (Oxford
1966) (6th ed. 2003).
48. See id. at 488–89; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702, cmt.
n (1987) (“Not all human rights norms are peremptory norms (jus cogens), but those in
clauses (a) to (f) of this section [including clause (b), ‘slavery or slave trade,’] are, and an
international agreement that violates them is void.”); International Law Commission,
Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts (2001), art. 40, cmts.
4–5, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf
[hereinafter Articles on Responsibility of States]. Among a number of generally accepted
peremptory norms, the Commission lists prohibitions against “slavery and the slave trade,
genocide, and racial discrimination and apartheid.” Id. art. 40, cmt. 4.
49. See BROWNLIE, supra note 47, at 488.
50. Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 53.
51. Id. (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.”).
52. See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 457 (D.N.J. 1999) (discussing the “clear import” interpretation rule of treaties).
53. See BROWNLIE, supra note 47, at 489.
54. See Winn, supra note 7, at 829.
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work of the International Law Commission (“ILC”).55 In 2001, in its efforts to restate the international law regarding wrongful acts committed
by sovereign nations, the ILC adopted the Articles on Responsibility of
States for International Wrongful Acts (“Articles on Responsibility of
States”).56 Article 40 of this work deals with state liability for breaches of
jus cogens norms.57 Article 41 provides that “[n]o state shall recognize as
lawful a situation created by a serious breach within Article 40, nor render
aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.”58 The ILC’s commentary
to Article 41 illuminates the Article’s intent by interpreting it to mean
that not only are breaches of jus cogens norms unlawful, but even a
State’s ratification, whether explicit or implicit, of a previous breach is
unacceptable, as it offends international principles and sentiments.59
Comment 9 to Article 41 specifies that an injured state cannot sanction
harm sustained from another nation’s breach of a jus cogens norm, “since
the breach by definition concerns the international community as a whole
[and] waiver or recognition induced from the injured State by the responsible State cannot preclude the international community interest in
ensuring a just and appropriate settlement.”60 Therefore, according to
the ILC’s rationale, claims for grave violations of human rights cannot be
waived, as each and every violation is an international concern, not only
a matter among several states, and the conscience of the international
community would only be offended by neglecting to remedy, or at least
entertain the claim for, such a breach.
Certain courts and judges have echoed the ILC’s sentiments in limiting
a nation’s ability to escape accountability for breaches of jus cogens
norms. For example, in Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan, a case of the
British House of Lords dealing with torture claims against a former Cuban
head of state, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that he was
exempt from liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.61 Lord
55. In order to actualize Article 13 of the U.N. Charter, which delegates to the General Assembly the obligation to “initiate studies and make recommendations” toward international cooperation and international law’s development and codification, U.N. Charter
art. 13, para. 1, the General Assembly established the International Law Commission in
1947 for the “promotion of the progressive development of international law and its
codification.” G.A. Res. 174 (II), U.N. Doc. A/519 (Nov. 21, 1947).
56. Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 48.
57. Id. art. 40.
58. Id. art. 41.
59. Id. art. 41, cmts. 1–14.
60. Id. art. 41, cmt. 9 (emphasis added).
61. Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Mag., Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte, 1 A.C.
147 (1999). Under the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity, a nation (or one of its
official representatives) acting within its “sovereign character” will not be made subject
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Phillips stated: as “torture is prohibited by international law and . . . the
prohibition against torture has the character of jus cogens[,] . . . it is . . .
accepted that officially sanctioned torture is forbidden by international
law.”62
In Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom,63 although the ECHR refused to deny
Kuwait’s sovereign immunity defense against a torture claim, eight of
the seventeen judges dissented, arguing that as a rule of jus cogens, and
therefore “hierarchically higher than any other rule of international law,”
a torture claim overrides a government’s ability to disregard it and to
escape liability by invoking the sovereign immunity defense.64 Although
these European cases deal primarily with the sovereign immunity defense, not treaty waivers, they are emblematic of the trend in international law reflected in the substance of the ILC’s Articles on Responsibility
of States. They echo the ILC’s premise that governments should not be
allowed to disregard or ratify claims for breaches of jus cogens norms.65
Judging from this trend, a persuasive argument can be made that governments must not be permitted to waive the claims of their citizens
when such claims are for breaches of jus cogens norms, as international
law regards them as supreme—almost sacred—rules with powerful overriding capabilities.66
to the jurisdiction of a foreign court without such nation’s consent. See Schooner Exchange
v. McFaddon & Others, 11 U.S. 116, 123–25 (1812). However, this doctrine has largely
given way in modern times to a more limiting theory of sovereign immunity, where a
nation will be unable to invoke the defense for acts arising out of its capacity as a commercial player. E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules as to Immunity of
Foreign Sovereign from Suit in Federal or State Courts, 25 A.L.R. 3d 322 § 2 (1969)
(“Growing concern for individual rights and public morality, coupled with the increasing
entry of governments into what had previously been regarded as private pursuits, has led
a substantial number of nations to abandon the absolute theory of sovereign immunity in
favor of a restrictive theory, under which a foreign sovereign is not granted immunity
from suit where the action arises out of its commercial activities, as distinguished from
acts done in its sovereign capacity.”).
62. Regina, 1 A.C. at 290 (emphasis added).
63. Al-Adsani v. U.K., App. No. 35763/97, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79 (2001).
64. Id. at 111–12 (Rozakis, J., Caflisch, J., Wildhaber, J., Costa, J., Cabral Barreto, J.,
& Vadic, J. dissenting).
65. See Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 47, art. 41, cmt. 9.
66. Andrea Gattini argues that, even if international law does not yet recognize claims
for violations of jus cogens norms that have been waived by a claimant’s nation, the acknowledgment of such claims could ensure legitimate international settlements:
[G]overnments . . . are in a [good] position to reach overall satisfactory and internationally binding settlements. It does not, however, follow that states are
free to waive any claim and to reach any settlement: they may not reciprocally
condone violations of those rules of humanitarian law which belong to jus co-
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II. THE ECHR’S “LEGITIMATE AIM” TEST: PRINCE HANS-ADAM II OF
LIECHTENSTEIN V. GERMANY
A. Background of the Prince’s Claims and Chapter 6 of the Convention
on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the Occupation
Prince Hans-Adam II’s claims arose out of events immediately following WWII.67 His father, a monarch of the German-speaking state of
Liechtenstein, which was a neutral power during the war, owned a castle
in the territory of present-day Czech Republic, in which were kept family
treasures dating back to at least the eighteenth century, including a cherished family painting, Szene an einem römischen Kalkofen (“the
Szene”).68 In 1945, the Czechoslovak government issued “the Beneš Decrees,” one of which, “Decree no. 12,” allowed for the “confiscation and
accelerated allocation” of certain German-owned property remaining
within the Czechoslovak territory in order to fulfill war reparations for
the harms caused by Germany during the war. 69 Thereafter, the Czechoslovak government confiscated the prince’s family castle, along with its
accompanying personal property, including the Szene.70 In 1951, the
prince’s father, in an attempt to reclaim his property, brought suit in the
Bratislava Administrative Court, which dismissed his petition, interpreting the monarch as a German national within the meaning of the Beneš
Decrees, and therefore subject to the confiscation measures therein.71
In 1952, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States
signed the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the
War and the Occupation (“Settlement Convention”).72 Chapter 6 of the
Settlement Convention states that Germany shall “in the future raise no
objections against the measures which have been, or will be, carried out
with regard to German external assets or other property . . . seized . . . by
the Three Powers with other Allied countries, neutral countries or former
allies of Germany.”73 Chapter 6 thus waives claims regarding German
gens. In such situations, individuals’ claims, although dubiously founded in international law, could have the beneficial effect of spurring states to reach settlements consistent with international law.
Gattini, supra note 3, at 348.
67. Prince Hans-Adam II of Liech. v. F.R.G., App. No. 42527/98, 2001-VIII Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1, 9–10 (2001).
68. Id. at 9.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 9, 28–29.
72. Convention on the Settlement, supra note 9.
73. Id. ch. 6, art. 3(1).
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property seized outside of its borders in the aftermath of WWII. Furthermore, Chapter 6 affirms that “[n]o claim or action shall be admissible against [. . .] international organizations, foreign governments or persons . . . ” and is therefore unambiguous and express, clearly denoting
that all German claims with regard to confiscated external property, including individual claims, are to be relinquished.74
In 1991, the prince discovered that the City of Brno, Czech Republic,
loaned the Szene to the Cologne municipality, and he obtained an interim
injunction from the Cologne Regional Court ordering the Szene to be
delivered to a temporary bailiff.75 From 1992 to 1998, the prince fiercely
litigated through the German courts in an attempt to reclaim his father’s
painting.76 However, the German courts consistently found that Chapter
6 of the Settlement Convention waived his claims, agreeing with the
1951 Bratislava Administrative Court decision that interpreted the monarchs as German nationals.77
B. The ECHR Appeal and the “Legitimate Aim” Test
In 1998, the prince filed an appeal with the European Court of Human
Rights, claiming, inter alia, that by dismissing his claims on the basis of
Chapter 6, the German courts had unfairly restricted his right of access to
the courts and thereby violated Article 6 of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European
Convention”).78 The ECHR found that under its body of case law, the
right of access to the court expressed in Article 6 of the European Convention may be subject to limitations.79 Placing the burden of proof on
the waiving nation, the court proposed that in order to validate a limitation on an individual’s right of access to the courts, three elements need
to be proved: (1) the limitation needs to pursue a legitimate aim; (2) such
legitimate aim and the means employed to secure it must bear a “reasonable relationship of proportionality” to each other; and (3) the limitation
must not completely obliterate or impede the “very essence” of the individual’s right of access to the court.80 Therefore, in order to determine
74. Id. ch. 6, art. 3(3) (emphasis added).
75. Liech., 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, at 10.
76. Id. at 10–15.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 21. Article 6 of the Convention reads in pertinent part: “[i]n the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is
entitled to a fair and public hearing . . . .” European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
79. Liech., 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, at 23.
80. Id.
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whether the claim waiver expressed in Chapter 6 of the Settlement Convention validly waived the prince’s claims, the ECHR applied this “legitimate aim” test.81
With regard to the first prong, the ECHR determined that Germany had
a legitimate aim in waiving claims for postwar property confiscation via
Chapter 6 of the Settlement Convention.82 It found that the Allied Powers’ victory and occupation of Germany immediately following the war
stripped the defeated power of its sovereignty and consigned it “under
the supreme authority of the [Allied Powers].”83 Indeed, the Allied Powers retained the ability to exercise broad rights over Germany and maintained military forces therein.84 Considering this backdrop, Germany at
the time of the Settlement Convention could hardly afford to negotiate
with the Allies on equal terms and at arm’s length; instead, it was in a
highly compromised position, forced to barter for the return of its very
sovereignty over its internal and external affairs.85 Under these circumstances, Germany’s waiver of individual property claims expressed in
Chapter 6 was proper in light of the legitimate aim to re-secure its national sovereignty.86
The ECHR also found the second prong, the proportionality requirement, fulfilled as to the legitimate aim of recovering state sovereignty.87
In weighing the interests of the prince in bringing his claim against the
legitimate aim of the government in achieving sovereignty and unity, the
court “attache[d] particular significance to the nature of the applicant’s
property claims in respect of the painting . . . .”88 It held that an interest
in litigating such claims “was not sufficient to outweigh the vital public
interest in regaining sovereignty and unifying Germany.”89 In consequence, the means of terminating property claims using the Chapter 6
waiver was found proportionate to Germany’s legitimate aim of attaining
sovereignty.90
As to the third prong of the legitimate aim test, whether the limitation
frustrates the “very essence” of the individual’s claim, the ECHR determined that the waiver did not impair the essence of the prince’s right to

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 25–31.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 25–26.
Id.
Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id.
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bring his claim.91 Although the court did not provide a clear analysis of
this prong,92 the basis of its determination can be inferred from its suggestion that there was a more proper forum for the prince’s claim—to
wit, the Czech or Slovak Republics—and that his father had already
brought his claim in Czechoslovakia in 1951.93 The ECHR appeared to
suggest that if there were another forum that the claimant has (or had)
access to, the “very essence” of his or her right would not be frustrated.94
Accordingly, since the prince’s father had already brought the claim before the Bratislava Administrative Court, the ECHR determined that the
“very essence” of his right had not been impaired by the waiver.95 As a
result of the court’s findings, the waiver of Chapter 6 was upheld as valid
over the prince’s claim.96
Although it is questionable whether the ECHR’s legitimate aim test
was correctly or fairly applied in the Liechtenstein case,97 it could still
serve as an effective method for balancing the interests of individuals in
bringing their war-related claims against the governmental interest in
securing policy goals by waiving such claims through peace treaties.

91. Id.
92. “[The ECHR] reached the conclusion that the [‘very essence’] condition was
satisfied, by rather clumsily drawing on the existence of the other two conditions.” Gattini, supra note 13, at 533.
93. Liech., 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, at 28–29 (“[T]he exclusion of German jurisdiction did not affect the great majority of such cases where property had remained within
the territory of the expropriating State. The genuine forum for the settlement disputes in
respect of these expropriation measures was, in the past, the courts of the former Czechoslovakia and, subsequently, the courts of the Czech or Slovak Republics. Indeed, in
1951 the applicant’s father had availed himself of the opportunity of challenging the expropriation in question before the Bratislava Administrative Court.”).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Winn, supra note 7, at 816–17. Winn criticizes the ECHR’s decision and
writes that “[the prince’s] situation is Kafkaesque: he is a citizen of a neutral country
who, after being deemed German by a court in Bratislava, has been unable to compel the
return of a painting confiscated as part of a World War II reparation scheme between
Germany and Czechoslovakia.” Id. at 816. Winn continues to describe “three violations
of rights guaranteed to the prince under international law” that the ECHR failed to remedy, namely, “(1) confiscation of the prince’s property by a foreign state without compensation; (2) determination of the prince’s citizenship by a foreign state; and (3) imposition
on the prince of a treaty not signed by Liechtenstein.” Id. at 816–17.
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III. CHINESE WWII SLAVE LABOR LITIGATION IN JAPAN AND CHINA’S
WAIVER OF CLAIMS IN ARTICLE 5 OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ
A. Origins of Slave Labor Litigation in Japan
In order to relieve internal labor shortages during the course of WWII,
from 1942 to 1945 the Japanese government orchestrated the abduction
and transportation to Japan of approximately 37,500 Chinese slave laborers.98 After arrival in Japan, the laborers were subjected to extreme hardship, including illness, severe working conditions, malnutrition, and violence.99 Owing to the harshness of their treatment, about 17.5% of the
slave laborers brought to Japan died during the course of the ordeal.100
After Japan’s defeat and the conclusion of the war, it signed a formal
peace treaty with most of the Allied Powers in 1951 in San Francisco
(“San Francisco Treaty”).101 Although Article 14 of the San Francisco
Treaty expressly waives all present and future war compensation claims
of the Allied Powers and their nationals,102 China (along with several
other nations previously in conflict with Japan) was not a party to the
treaty.103 Recognizing that the San Francisco Treaty was incomplete
without the inclusion of all relevant parties, it authorized Japan to enact
bilateral peace treaties with nonparticipating nations.104 In 1972, Japan
endeavored to complete one of these bilateral peace treaties by signing a
Joint Communiqué with the People’s Republic of China.105 Article 5 of
98. Lü Zhigang v. Nishimatsu Constr., 1969 HANREI JIHŌ 31, 32 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 27,
2007). The number of Korean slave laborers transported to Japan during the same period
is estimated at approximately 290,000. Id.
99. Id. at 32–33.
100. Id. at 33.
101. Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 136 U.N.T.S. 46 [hereinafter San Francisco Treaty].
102. Id. ch. V, art. 14(b) (“[T]he Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the
Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any
actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and
claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.”).
103. Nishimatsu, 1969 HANREI JIHŌ at 33.
104. San Francisco Treaty, supra note 101, art. 26.
105. Joint Communiqué, supra note 17. Actually, Japan had previously signed a peace
treaty with the Republic of China in 1952 in Taipei (“Taipei Treaty”). Treaty of Peace
between the Republic of China and Japan (1952), available at http://www.taiwandocuments.
org/taipei01.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) [hereinafter Taipei Treaty]. The government
of the Republic of China, based in Taiwan at the time, was the competing government
vying for power against the communist People’s Republic of China, but became virtually
powerless after the communist government secured dominance; hence, the Taipei Treaty,
from a practical point of view, became completely irrelevant with regard to Chinese/Japanese postwar relations. See Nishimatsu, 1969 HANREI JIHŌ at 33–34.
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the Joint Communiqué reads: “[t]he Government of the People’s Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the
Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.”106 There is no further explanation or definition of the
term “war reparations” found in the Joint Communiqué, however, leaving the reader unsure as to whether the waiver is meant to include individual compensation claims by victims of war, or simply refers only to
governmental claims.107 A formal peace treaty between the two nations
was eventually signed in 1978, in which the terms of the Communiqué
were ratified.108
B. The Japanese Judiciary’s Treatment of Article 5 of the Joint Communiqué
In 1986, the People’s Republic of China established a law that made it
permissible for Chinese nationals to travel outside of their nation’s borders, enabling Chinese WWII victims to bring their claims in Japanese
courts.109 Consequently, following the example of earlier Korean slave
labor litigation, a group of Chinese slave labor plaintiffs brought their
first suit in Tokyo District Court in 1995 against the copper mining firm
under which they were forced to work during the war.110 In holding that
the plaintiffs’ claims were barred under the Civil Code’s statute of limitations for tort claims,111 the Tokyo District Court avoided addressing the
merits of their claims.112 This case initiated a trend among Japanese
judges handling Chinese slave labor cases—that of dismissing war compensation claims by utilizing a handful of defenses before getting to a
discussion of their merits.113
106. Joint Communiqué, supra note 17, art. 5.
107. Id.
108. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, supra note 18 (“Confirming that . . . the Joint
Communiqué constitutes the basis of the relations of peace and friendship between the
two countries . . . the principles enunciated in the Joint Communiqué should be strictly
observed . . . .”).
109. Nishimatsu, 1969 HANREI JIHŌ at 34.
110. Geng Zhun v. Kajima, 988 HANREI TAIMUZU 250 (Tokyo D. Ct., Dec. 12, 1997).
111. MINPŌ, art. 724 (“The right to demand compensation for damages which has arisen from an unlawful act shall lapse by prescription if not exercised within three years
from the time when the injured party or his/her legal representative became aware of such
damage and of the identity of the person who caused it, the same shall apply if twenty
years have elapsed from the time when the unlawful act was committed.”).
112. Kajima, 988 HANREI TAIMUZU at 254.
113. See Webster, supra note 14, at 753–54. Webster states that statutes of limitations
and government immunity are the two most widely used defenses applied by Japanese
courts in the slave labor context. He proceeds to describe these defenses as technical and
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Initially favoring Article 5 of the Joint Communiqué as an effective legal defense, Japanese courts were largely successful in disposing of Chinese claims by concluding that, ipso facto, any Chinese citizen’s individual claim arising out of WWII had been settled by agreement of both
governments and was thus barred.114 Despite this trend, as the below cases demonstrate, several district court judges gradually began to refuse to
follow their colleagues’ formalist interpretation of Article 5 by scrutinizing the ambiguous language in a larger context of international policy
and fairness.
In 2002, analyzing the scope of Article 5’s waiver of claims, the Fukuoka District Court in Chinese Victims of Forced Labor v. Mitsui Mining
assigned particular significance to a 1995 statement by the Chinese foreign minister in which he expressly denied that the People’s Republic of
China had any intention of including individual claims when it negotiated Article 5’s waiver, declaring instead that it was meant to be limited
to the government’s war reparation claims.115 The Fukuoka court determined that this affirmation clarified the ambiguity in China’s waiver and
allowed the Chinese plaintiffs in this case to bring their claims on the
merits.116
In Chinese Victims of Sexual Violence v. Japan, a case involving
WWII Chinese “military comfort women,” the Tokyo District Court examined the ambiguity of the phrase “war reparations” in Article 5 of the
Joint Communiqué.117 It distinguished “war reparations” from the phrase
“compensation for injury,” the former being inherently a state issue and
the latter being payment for a claim that only an individual can bring.118
Based on this distinction, the Tokyo District Court held that the clear
import of the provision illustrates that the waiver in Article 5 applies only to the Chinese government’s “war reparations,” not to individual compensation claims.119
as having “talismanic properties,” which allow judges to arbitrarily decide cases on the
“whims of spells.” Id. at 754. Another typical technical defense successful in Japanese
courts when war reparation claims are brought under international law rather than Japanese civil law includes barring claims owing to the lack of an underlying treaty provision
that would explicitly allow such claims. See Hae Bong, supra note 16, at 189–90.
114. See Gao, supra note 19, at 536; Hae Bong, supra note 16, at 189–90.
115. See Chinese Victims of Forced Labor v. Mitsui Mining, 1809 HANREI JIHŌ 111,
121 (Fukuoka Dist. Ct., Apr. 26, 2002).
116. Id.
117. Chinese Victims of Sexual Violence v. Japan, 1127 HANREI TAIMUZU 281, 295
(Tokyo Dist. Ct., Apr. 24, 2003).
118. Id.
119. Id. (“The Joint Communiqué should be interpreted within the basic framework of
international law. Claims against our country as the assailing nation during the Second
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In Zhang Wenbin v. Rinko Co., arguably the greatest victory for slave
laborer plaintiffs,120 the Niigata District Court also interpreted China’s
waiver in Article 5 to refer only to governmental claims.121 The court
emphasized that the language of the provision explicitly states that the
government of the People’s Republic of China renounces all war reparations, but makes no mention that private, individual claims are to be relinquished.122 In reaching this conclusion (like the Fukuoka District
Court in Mitsui Mining), the court in Rinko gave deference to official
representations by Chinese public officials—particularly the 1995 statement of the Chinese foreign minister—in adhering to the interpretation of
Article 5 as meaning only a renunciation of governmental claims.123
In July 2004, the Hiroshima High Court in Lü Zhigang v. Nishimatsu
Construction refused to construe Article 5 as barring the claims of Chinese slave labor victims forced to work in coal mines during the war, and
reversed a district court decision124 in favor of the defendant companies.125 For similar reasons as the above-cited district court cases, it held
that the claims China waived in Article 5 definitively stopped at government-specific war reparations, and that since individual claims were not
at all mentioned, they should not be barred.126
World War by the People’s Republic of China . . . for compensation, so-called ‘war reparations,’ are all that is waived; claims against our nation by individual Chinese victims
for compensation, so-called ‘compensation for injury,’ are nowhere relinquished.”) (author’s translation).
120. This case is considered particularly significant for Chinese slave labor plaintiffs
because it marks the first time a Japanese court recognized liability on the part of the
Japanese government—in addition to a defendant corporation—for harms suffered by the
slave laborers. See Hae Bong, supra note 16, at 196.
121. Zhang Wenbin v. Rinko Co., 50 SHŌMU GEPPŌ 3444, 3603 (Niigata Dist. Ct.,
Mar. 26, 2004).
122. Id. at 3606–08.
123. Id. The court in Rinko also found influential an official statement by the Chinese
government expressed on the website of the Japanese Embassy to China, which articulated that, during the Joint Communiqué’s negotiation process, the People’s Republic of
China, acting in response to Japan’s expression of great responsibility and deep remorse
for the harm it had caused to the Chinese people during the war, agreed to relinquish all
claims for war reparations. Id. at 3607. Notwithstanding this fact, the statement purported
that the government of China urges Japan to take proper measures and respond with seriousness to protect the interests of individual Chinese WWII victims (such as victims of
chemical weapons, slave laborers, and “military comfort women”). Id. at 3607–08. The
court was moved by this statement and concluded that, based on the premise that it relinquished all its war reparation claims, the government of China expects that Japan take
responsibility to resolve outstanding issues in regard to individual claims. Id. at 3608.
124. 1110 HANREI TAIMUZU 253 (Hiroshima Dist. Ct., July 9, 2002).
125. 1865 HANREI JIHŌ 62 (Hiroshima High Ct., July 9, 2004).
126. Id. at 89–91.
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C. The Japanese Supreme Court’s Review of Lü Zhigang v. Nishimatsu
In April 2007, the Supreme Court of Japan accepted the Nishimatsu
case for review and, for the first time in the course of slave labor litigation in Japan, endeavored to determine the scope of Article 5’s waiver.127
The court admitted that the waiver was ambiguous and its scope undefined.128 Then it unanimously held that Article 5 should be interpreted as
barring all Chinese citizens’ individual claims arising out of WWII,
based primarily on two reasons: (1) the historical evidence shows that the
Joint Communiqué was the product of negotiation and compromise between Japan and China, which were conditioned upon China accepting a
conclusion to the war and the resolution of all outstanding issues in exchange for good consideration; and (2) the Joint Communiqué must be
interpreted within the framework of the San Francisco Treaty, which had
as its main goal the attainment of peace by means of settling all claims—
including individual ones—and resolving outstanding issues.129
With regard to the first reason for finding that Article 5 waived individual claims, the supreme court looked at the historical background and
negotiations behind the signing of the Joint Communiqué and found that
China and Japan had demanded the acceptance of certain basic principles
as preconditions to signing.130 The court stated that the Chinese government had three basic requirements: (1) that Japan recognize the communist government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole, legitimate,
and lawful representative of China; (2) that Japan recognize Taiwan as
the territory solely of the People’s Republic of China; and (3) that the
Taipei Treaty between Japan and the Republic of China131 be deemed
illegal and without effect.132 In contrast, Japan expected the People’s Republic of China to accept similar terms to those reflected in the Taipei
Treaty and officially acknowledge the conclusion of WWII and the complete termination of all war reparation claims and other outstanding is-

127. Lü Zhigang v. Nishimatsu Constr., 1969 HANREI JIHŌ 31 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 27,
2007).
128. Id. at 36 (“[I]t is unclear by just looking at [Article 5] whether its substance
waives claims in addition to war reparations, and if it does, whether the waiver is meant
to include individual claims by Chinese citizens.”) (author’s translation).
129. Id. at 36–37.
130. Id.
131. Taipei Treaty, supra note 105. The obvious reason the People’s Republic of China was so interested in invalidating the Taipei Treaty was because it was signed by its
competing, noncommunist, Chinese government, the Republic of China, which it, of
course, did not recognize.
132. Nishimatsu, 1969 HANREI JIHŌ at 36.
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sues.133 The court illustrated that, from these different viewpoints,
through much effort and negotiation, both countries acceded to each other’s demands and came to mutual understanding and agreement, the
terms of which were memorialized in the Joint Communiqué (albeit imperfectly since it failed to clearly enunciate a waiver of individual
claims).134 From this historical context of negotiation and mutual effort
toward postwar stabilization, the court concluded that both nations intended the Joint Communiqué to be a peace treaty of great significance
with the force to bring the war, all outstanding issues, and all related
claims—including all individual claims—to a definitive end.135
In addition, the Court determined that, as a component of the series of
events that comprise WWII’s epilogue, the Joint Communiqué should be
understood and interpreted only within the framework of the San Francisco Treaty, the primary peace treaty governing postwar matters between Japan and its enemies, and should not deviate from its substance
or purport.136 The court reasoned that the parties to the San Francisco
Treaty, understanding that individual claims would obstruct their critical
goal of establishing a conclusion to the war and overarching peace, wisely crafted the treaty to cause all parties to specifically waive all claims.137
Because the claims waiver of Article 5 of the Joint Communiqué should
be interpreted only within this framework, the court concluded, it should
be construed to include individual claims, as does the San Francisco
Treaty.138 Therefore, the Chinese plaintiffs were found to have no right to

133. Id. In contrast with the ambiguity in Article 5 of the Joint Communiqué, Article
11 of the Taipei Treaty incorporates the San Francisco Treaty, which explicitly waives
individual claims; by extension, the Taipei Treaty also waives all individual claims. Taipei Treaty, supra note 105, art. 11 (“[A]ny problem arising between the Republic of China and Japan as a result of the existence of a state of war shall be settled in accordance
with the relevant provisions of the San Francisco Treaty.”). The court in Nishimatsu argued that Japan relied on the terms in the Taipei Treaty during the negotiation process
that preceded the signing of the Joint Communiqué, despite the fact that the People’s
Republic of China was not a party to the Taipei Treaty. 1969 HANREI JIHŌ at 36. It looked
at the subjective intent of the Japanese government during the negotiation process and
found that, “with regard to the conclusion of war [between Japan and China] and the
termination of all war reparation and other claims, the Japanese government could only
but rely on the premise that all these matters had already been resolved in the [Taipei
Treaty] in a formal manner.” Id. (author’s translation).
134. Id. at 36–37.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 37.
137. Id. at 34–35.
138. Id. at 37.
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bring suit; their claims were deemed to be waived, as understood within
the overarching framework of WWII’s conclusion.139
The effect of Nishimatsu is that it conclusively legitimizes Article 5’s
waiver within the Japanese courts and clarifies its ambiguity by determining that it extends to both government war reparation and individual
claims.140 Since Japan is a civil law country without a firm doctrine of
stare decisis, the structure of the court system is such that the Supreme
Court’s decisions are technically not binding on inferior courts.141 However, the decisions are nonetheless tremendously influential and followed
almost without exception.142 Nishimatsu leaves a strong precedent for
lower courts to follow, and it is highly unlikely that it would ever be contradicted by a lower court.143 It would appear that hereafter, Chinese
WWII-era victims have very little chance of having their claims heard in
Japan.
IV. THE LEGITIMATE AIM TEST APPLIED TO WWII CHINESE SLAVE
LABOR LITIGATION IN JAPAN
This Note proposes that, because of the ambiguity in Article 5 of the
Joint Communiqué,144 the ECHR’s “legitimate aim” test is appropriate to
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. CHARLES F. GOODMAN, JUSTICE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN 444 (2004) (“A
decision of the [Japanese] Supreme Court, like all other judgments, binds only the parties
to the action in front of the court. The civil law does not recognize starie [sic] decisis and
hence the court’s reasoning is, in theory, not controlling on the lower courts in future
cases.”).
142. Id. Goodman explains that Japan’s Civil Code strongly encourages uniformity
within Japanese case law, which “in essence direct[s] the [lower courts] to follow the
Supreme Court’s precedent—as if it were starie [sic] decisis.” Id.
143. Indeed, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Nishimatsu, as recent decisions
affirm, the lower courts have clearly followed its reasoning. See, e.g., Associated Press,
Japanese Court Rejects WWII Forced Labor Lawsuit, INT’L HERALD TRIB.: ASIA-PAC.,
Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/19/asia/AS-GEN-Japan-ForcedLabor.php (reporting that the Toyama District Court dismissed claims of Korean slave
labor plaintiffs on the basis that “war-related claims had already been settled under postwar peace and compensation treaties”); Leslie Schulman, Japan High Court Dismisses Chinese WWII Slave Labor Suit, JURIST, June 28, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/
06/japan-high-court-dismisses-chinese-wwii.php; Theage.com.au, Chinese WWII Slaves Miss
out on Compo, Aug. 30, 2007, http://www.theage.com.au/news/World/Chinese-WWIIslaves-miss-out-on-compo/2007/08/30/1188067198546.html (noting that the Maebashi
District Court, in dismissing the claims of Chinese slave labor plaintiffs, “appeared to
take its cue from [Nishimatsu, which] ruled [that] individual Chinese citizens lost their
right to seek redress from Japan following [the Joint Communiqué]”).
144. Since the Japanese Supreme Court in Nishimatsu found that Article 5’s waiver
was ambiguous, see Nishimatsu, 1969 HANREI JIHŌ at 36, even while holding that the
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apply to the slave labor situation in Japan to determine whether the Chinese government legitimately waived the claims of its citizens, and therefore, whether the conclusion of the Japanese Supreme Court—that Article 5 applies to all Chinese claims—should be overturned. In applying
the ECHR’s test, a court would have to determine whether the Chinese
government: (1) had a legitimate aim in waiving the claims of individual
victims of war; (2) this waiver of claims was a proportional means to that
legitimate aim; and (3) the “very essence” of the Chinese litigants’ right
to bring their claims was not impaired by the waiver.145 It becomes clear,
when applying the legitimate aim test, that a court would likely determine that the ambiguous waiver does not legitimately annul the claims of
the Chinese individual plaintiffs and would allow their claims to proceed
on the merits.
A. The Legitimate Aim Element
A court would likely find that the People’s Republic of China had a legitimate aim in waiving its citizens’ war-related claims through Article 5
of the Joint Communiqué. In determining that Germany had a legitimate
aim in waiving postwar property claims, the ECHR focused on the fact
that Germany was in a highly compromised position, with the pressing
need to regain its sovereignty following the war.146 In contrast, when the
People’s Republic of China signed the Joint Communiqué, bloodshed
and warfare had ended two decades earlier, and the communist government was securely established, albeit not unanimously recognized by all
other world powers.147 Based on the historical facts enumerated by the
Japanese Supreme Court, China’s primary purpose for entering into the
Joint Communiqué was to obtain Japan’s legal recognition of its newly
established communist government and its complete ownership of the
territory of Taiwan.148 In addition, China had the overarching goal of
reestablishing friendly relations and economic intercourse with Japan.149
These are certainly weighty policy considerations, but clearly the temporal and situational circumstances of China were not nearly as grave as
waiver applies to individual claims, this Note concludes that Article 5’s waiver is ambiguous for purposes of satisfying the ambiguity threshold before applying the legitimate
aim test. For the reasoning this Note adopts in requiring an ambiguity threshold as a prerequisite to the legitimate aim test, see supra note 22.
145. See Prince Hans-Adam II of Liech. v. F.R.G., App. No. 42527/98, 2001-VIII Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1, 23 (2001).
146. See id. at 25–27.
147. See Nishimatsu, 1969 HANREI JIHŌ at 34.
148. See id. at 36.
149. See generally Joint Communiqué, supra note 17.
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they had been for Germany at the time it waived its citizens’ claims, and
therefore the purpose in waiving was not as significant.
Though it may be useful for challengers of the waiver to distinguish
the goals of the waiving nations by degree of urgency, ultimately, it
would probably do little to persuade a court that the People’s Republic of
China did not have a legitimate aim under these facts. Certainly, Germany’s situation was extreme, and obviously, it had a legitimate purpose
because it had no choice but to waive the claims of its citizens at the
time.150 However, that does not mean a less extreme situation, like China’s at the time of the Joint Communiqué, would not also be legitimate,
as long as it was not frivolous or unwarranted. Therefore, since the
People’s Republic of China did have significant policy justifications for
Article 5’s waiver, though by degree not as compelling as Germany’s, a
court would likely find that China had a legitimate aim.
B. The Proportionality Element
A court would probably find that the individual claim waiver of Article
5 did not bear a “reasonable relationship of proportionality”151 to China’s
legitimate goal of attaining legal recognition from and establishing a collegial relationship with Japan. The court in Liechtenstein considered
Prince Hans-Adam II’s property claim insufficient to “outweigh the vital
public interest in regaining sovereignty and unifying Germany.”152 It then
concluded that Germany’s action of waiving such property claims was
reasonably proportionate to its legitimate aim of reestablishing itself.153
In contrast with property appropriation, however, there appears to be
general consensus that the prohibition against slave labor is an accepted
jus cogens norm.154 It is clear that jus cogens norms have increasingly
powerful influence in international law, and waivers of jus cogens
breaches should be taken particularly seriously.155 Furthermore, Germany’s situation at the time it waived its citizen’s property claims was much
more critical than China’s at the time it signed the Joint Communiqué.156
Under these circumstances, the balance between a waiver of jus cogens
slavery claims against China’s primary aim of legal recognition appears
much less proportional, especially when compared with the balance that
was drawn between Germany’s grave circumstances and its waiver of
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See Liech., 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, at 26–27.
See id. at 23 (discussing the proportionality element).
Id. at 29.
Id.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
See Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 48, art. 41, cmts. 1–14.
See discussion supra Part IV(a).
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relatively impotent property claims in the Liechtenstein case.157 Accordingly, the scales tip in favor of the Chinese litigants owing to the gravity
of their jus cogens claims, creating a stark imbalance. Therefore, after
finding that jus cogens claims had been waived for relatively insubstantial reasons, a court would likely find that Article 5 was not proportional
to China’s legitimate aim.
C. The “Very Essence” Element
A court would probably find that the “very essence” of the right of
Chinese slave labor victims to have their claims heard is impeded by
Article 5’s waiver. The court in Liechtenstein was impressed by the fact
that there was another, more appropriate, forum for the plaintiff’s claims
in Czechoslovakia and thereby determined that the very essence of his
right had not been impeded by his nation’s waiver.158 Thus, the court
illustrated that the very essence of a claimant’s right to bring a claim is
not impeded by a treaty waiver when there exists another forum in which
to bring his or her claims.159 In the case of the Chinese slave labor victims, it would be difficult to imagine a more appropriate forum than
Japan. As in Czechoslovakia, all possible defendants reside in the country (in this case, Japan), and it is the locus where the protested activity
took place. Indeed, there does not appear to be any other tenable forum
for the Chinese plaintiffs.160 Thus, the litigants would be left without
anywhere to bring their claims and be likely to convince a court that the
very essence of their right is impaired by Article 5’s waiver.

157. Andrea Gattini remarks on this, suggesting that Prince Hans-Adam II’s claim
might have succeeded if the underlying harm he suffered was a jus cogens violation, not
just a mere appropriation of property:
[U]nder what conditions could or should a state disregard an obligation it undertook not to allow claims or actions relating to property seized under certain
circumstances elsewhere? The answer is, when the seizure was a breach of a
peremptory norm of international law. It is difficult to characterize the Benes
Decrees in that way . . . .
Gattini, supra note 13, at 544.
158. See Liech., 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, at 28–29.
159. See id.
160. In fact, several Chinese and other WWII victims have filed actions against the
Japanese government and certain Japanese corporations in the United States, but they
have been unsuccessful, as American courts have largely refused to entertain their claims.
See generally Haberstroh, supra note 14 (providing a discussion of WWII slave labor
lawsuits in U.S. courts and an accounting of the plaintiffs’ failures therein). Even if
American courts decided to entertain such cases, it would be a much more incongruous
and inappropriate forum than the Japanese courts.

2008]

WAIVERS OF CLAIMS VIA TREATY

265

Therefore, the Chinese government’s waiver in Article 5 would likely
fail the ECHR’s legitimate aim test in Liechtenstein and be declared
invalid.
CONCLUSION
When applied to slave labor litigation in Japan, the legitimate aim test
would likely weigh in favor of the Chinese slave labor plaintiffs, causing
the claim waiver in Article 5 of the Joint Communiqué to be invalidated
as to individual claims and overturning the Japanese Supreme Court’s
decision in Nishimatsu. In waiving the WWII Chinese victims’ individual claims through Article 5, though a court would be likely to find that
the People’s Republic of China had a legitimate aim, it would also be
likely to find that the waiver, in its termination of jus cogens claims, was
not proportionate to that legitimate aim, and that the waiver frustrated the
“very essence” of the Chinese victims’ claims because there does not
exist any viable alternative forum in which to bring them.
By using the slave labor litigation scenario as a test case, it becomes
apparent that the ECHR’s legitimate aim analysis offers a viable method
for balancing the powers and interests of governments with the rights of
individual victims of war. Since nations require functional and foreseeable rules in order to establish peace following warfare,161 the legitimate
aim test should not apply unless the threshold question of ambiguity in a
waiver provision has been answered; that is, for purposes of efficiency
and public policy, if a treaty waiver is clear and unambiguous in relinquishing all individual claims, the question should end there, and the
waiver should be upheld without any further analysis.162 However, when
faced with an ambiguous treaty waiver, like Article 5 of the Joint Communiqué, the legitimate aim test provides the means to effectively weigh
the traditional governmental power to waive all war-related claims
through peace treaties against international law’s increasing concern for
human rights and the individual’s right to judicial recourse for harms
suffered.
From a human rights perspective, the ECHR’s test has great value. It
places an emphasis on the “very essence” of the individual’s right to
have his or her claim heard by requiring an alternative forum. In addition, it mandates that the government have sound policy reasons for

161. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
162. Since it is common for nations to be very specific in waiving claims postwar, see
Gattini, supra note 3, at 366, it seems evident that governments would typically be able to
avoid the legitimate aim test altogether by relying on the clarity of their well-tailored
treaty language to dispel any claim of ambiguity.
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waiving such claims,163 and thereby ensures that it does not dispense with
them for frivolous or self-serving purposes. Finally, the legitimate aim
test contains the proportionality requirement, which can serve as a valuable method for balancing the interests at stake and determining overall
fairness. Perhaps most importantly, the proportionality requirement, in
weighing the interests, allows a court to underscore the increasing international significance of jus cogens norms, and to acutely assess instances
where they are violated.
Nicholas S. Richard*

163. In most cases, it appears that governments would not have a difficult time coming
up with a “legitimate aim.” Indeed, securing peace following warfare would almost always automatically seem to qualify as a legitimate aim. Therefore, the tension in future
cases potentially applying the legitimate aim test would most likely be found in the “proportionality” prong. In this sense, it might be interesting to draw an analogy to U.S. constitutional law and the equal protection clause in regard to gender discrimination, where
finding an “important governmental interest” for a gender classification is just the doorway to the more difficult question of whether the classification is “substantially related”
to the achievement of governmental aims—in other words, whether the means of gender
classification is “substantially related” (compare with “proportional”) to the “important
governmental interest” (compare with “legitimate aim”) sought to be achieved. Cf. Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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